On Freedom

Le Guin in her quote emphasises that the universe is not a “machine”, where every part must have a functional utility. To her, purpose is a human-made cage and it automatically limits our freedom to simply exist. I interpret this as her defining freedom as something which does not perceive a human as a mean to an end.

Therefore, from what I understand her statement can be divided into two sections:

1) Things do not have a purpose because their existence precedes essence

2) Freedom; human being a “thread in the cloth” which requires no further explanation

This represents a way in which I will approach the discussion of freedom and determinism along with providing adequate framework for rationality. Furthermore, in my conclusion I will provide an additional interpretation of her quote, through Taoist principle.

To approach the discussion of freedom and determinism effectively, we must first address the ontological origin of human action. On a pre-theoretical level, we often assume that our actions result directly from a conscious will; a choice reflecting our immediate desires. However this assumption invites a deeper investigation; what is causal origin of these acts of will? Are they merely spontaneous psychological events emerging from ex nihilo (out of nowhere), or are they links in an unbroken causal chain?

If a choice appears “suddenly” in consciousness, does its apparent spontaneity suffice to label it free, or are we merely observing the internal manifestation of prior, hidden causes?

Before evaluating these alternatives, it is essential to clarify the conceptual framework of freedom. Rather than a singular definition there are two main established understandings which seem to dominate when it comes to depicting freedom.

The first is circumstantial freedom, often described as a negative condition; the absence of external obstacles and natural limitations which seem to restrict an agent’s ability to act on their desires. While this notion is accepted in everyday context, it remains philosophically incomplete, as it fails to account for the origin of the choices themselves.

The second, more contentious notion is metaphysical freedom, or “free will” in the robust sense. This concept suggests that the self is the creative, originating cause of an action, independent of prior conditions. It follows that if we possess metaphysical freedom, then the given circumstances and predetermined patterns prior to a decision are not sufficient to make a particular choice necessary or inevitable. External circumstances and our personality may exert some influence over our decisions, but in the final evaluation, which of several alternatives we act on is decided by our free, spontaneous choice. Therefore, the ability to obtain this freedom allows the self the capacity to make free and undetermined choices within the bounds of external limitations.

SECTION I- THE NATURE OF HUMAN ACTION; Defining Rationality

To understand the tension between freedom and determinism, one must first analyse the nature of human action through the distinction between rational and irrational agency. Both of these are dependent to what extent our actions and beliefs align with evidence, logic and the pursuit of goals.

The central claim of this section will be based on the statement that freedom without reason lacks direction, whereas reason without freedom loses its existential significance.

Firstly, I will evaluate Kant’s stance on the matter, while comparing it with opposing theories, like rational egoism. While evaluating both their strengths and weaknesses the aim is to provide a foundation for the definition of freedom.

There are convincing reasons to perceive the human beings as a dualistic entity. A creature both subject to sensible impulses and capable of self-determination.

It is found that Kant has serious implications not just when defining morality but also when approaching freedom determinism issue. He argues that human beings are neither pure animals (arbitrium brutum), as we are not purely determined by sensory impulses with no rational input, nor divine wills, as we are also not exclusively rational beings who can automatically act correctly without any sensory interference. Therefore, he characterises human agency as “hybrid will” (arbitrium impurum), which directly means that we exist in a state of irresolvable tension between duty and pleasure. For Kant, this tension is precisely what creates the space for genuine freedom. Moreover, if we interpret his perception of freedom, it can be said, that freedom is the “bridge” where the elective will decides which source of motivation (duty) and personal-inclination (self-love) is granted priority.

In Kant’s framework, a rational action is not merely a calculated move to satisfy a desire, but one performed by a “good will” acting in accordance with the moral law. In the accordance with moral law conversely, an irrational action is viewed as a betrayal of our rational nature. It is a practical failure where the agent treats reason as a mere tool for selfish ends, or worse, violates the very structure of universalizable logic.

Furthermore, if we connect this to my central claim it can be concluded that Kant acknowledges that the coexistence of freedom and determinism remains an unresolved mystery at the core of human nature. This is achieved, with an aspect I mentioned previously; the human being depicted as dual entity. This can be illustrated with the claim that human being is neither completely phenomenal being, adhering to natural laws, nor is it noumenal being, but he is bridging two realities.

Therefore consequently, Kant’s philosophy reflects the central claim that freedom and reason are not opposing forces but independent conditions which together give human action structure and purpose.

This however stands in stark contrast to the perspective of rational egoism which posits that an action is rational if, and only if it maximises the agent’s long-term self-interest. However, this position seems to face a significant internal challenge. If reason is merely a sophisticated instrument for navigating reality in pursuit of pre-determined biological or social interests, can the agent be free? From a Kantian perspective a rational egoists is not free, but rather determined by “external” interests; factors which originate outside of the autonomous legislative power of reason. (include your own thoughts)

For instance, imagine a man, who is fully aware of his own dysfunction. He knows he is being spiteful. He knows his actions hurt him more than anyone else. And he does it anyway, even deliberately. This is Dostoevsky’s Underground Man and he posits himself as the proof of something he considers crucial while also opposing core values rational egoists hold dear. Namely, he argues that human life is fueled by desire for self-assertion.

However, while the Underground Man’s position provides a powerful psychological critique, it also faces a logical contradiction. The mere presence of irrational impulses does not necessarily disprove determinism. A deterministic universe can easily account for “spite” as a product of prior psychological causes. However, when we synthesise these views, a more complex picture of freedom emerges. We can argue for “dual evidence” of freedom; it manifests both as the Kantian capacity to follow a higher rational law and the existential capacity to act out of pure spontaneity.

Therefore, it can be concluded that both instances suggest that the human agent is not a mere object in a causal chain. Moreover what emerges from this analysis is once again, a fundamental question; is genuine freedom governed by necessity?

SECTION II- THE FREE WILL; Freedom and Determinism

Expanding the inquiry, we must shift the direction of discussion from the nature of human actions to the metaphysical conflict between hard determinism and existential freedom.

Hard determinism, at its core, holds that everything, including human actions, is the inevitable result of prior causes. Therefore, if one possessed complete knowledge of the universe at any given time, it would be possible to predict every future event.

Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory exemplifies this position, through what he called psychic determinism; the view that all thoughts, feelings, and behaviours have an underlying, unconscious cause. Therefore, it can be understood that his argument was based on the statement that nothing in mental life happens by chance; every act is a link in a chain of causes. His concept of “Freudian slips” further emphasises his position, as he strongly believed that forgotten names, dreams and tongue slips were not simply accidents; but actions driven by unconscious desires.

Freud did allow for a limited, relative freedom; through psychoanalysis, one could make “unconscious conscious”. This meant that individuals would shift hidden causes into conscious awareness and thereby gaining some degree of control over one’s behaviour. Yet, this concession is modest as Freud ultimately rejected robust free will, viewing freedom as a psychological illusion rather than a lived reality. Even the daily choices people believe they make freely are, on his account, expression of forces they neither chose nor fully understand.

It is precisely this concept of the unconscious that Jean-Paul Sartre targets in his central counter-argument. Sartre on the other hand argues that appealing to the unconscious is not a neutral psychological observation, it is a form of self-deception and a way of evading the burden of responsibility; this is what he calls “Bad faith”.

Bad faith is the condition in which a person pretends that it is not free. Rather than confronting the anxiety which comes with absolute freedom, individuals start adopting false identities, social roles, habits, circumstances; all while treating themselves as fixed objects rather than conscious agents.

His famous claim; that man is “condemned to be free”, is the cornerstone of his position, standing in direct opposition to psychic determinism. The word condemned is deliberately uncomfortable because it strips any romantic appeal from freedom and presents it as a metaphysical fact. One does not choose to exist, yet the existence is already underway, and every moment demands a choice. Even the refusal to choose is itself a choice. There is no exit.

In this way, Sartre also criticises traditional free will debate in a way that it seems to refer to humans as objects; either determined machines or uncaused supernatural agents. By recentering the question on existence itself, he offers a more radical claim; freedom is not something we have or lack, it is the way we are.

CONCLUSION

In Taoist philosophy, purpose is not something which can be invented, but it is perceived more as something you uncover, by returning to your original, natural state.

This framework suggests that life has no “final goal” or a certain destination. Instead, the purpose of life is found in living itself; specifically living in harmony with the Tao (the natural flow of the universe)

What I can interpret from Le Guin’s quote can also be depicted using terminology within Taoist framework is that every individual can possess an “uncarved block” (Pu) or an original nature (Xing). The purpose of an individual is to align its actions with this innate nature rather than simply follow societal expectations.

Furthermore, the purpose is fulfilled through Wu Wei (Effortless action), or acting without forcing. By yielding to the natural current of life, we can strive to achieve a state of “natural grace” where our existence becomes its own justification.

For this reason, I can also interpret this principle as completely opposing the idea that purpose is tied to external achievements. Instead the emphasis is on inner peace, moderation, and simplicity.

To conclude, in my essay I interpreted her quote through the lens of different theories but ultimately what was aimed to be proven is that freedom without reason lacks direction whereas reason without freedom loses meaning.